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ABSTRACT. The improvement of the manufacturing productivity today is increasingly a 
result of cooperation between companies. Reflection on such industrial organization called 
“industrial architecture” aims at the development of a specific decision-making and control 
supports. The objective of our work is to propose a formalization of this cooperation by 
intending to coordinate the means used for consumer goods production. This formalization 
allows to establish an assistance tool for the distributed control of  material and information 
flow between firms. Multi-criteria analysis is used  to find the best balance between the delay 
and the cost in order negotiation. 
RÉSUMÉ. Le gain en productivité passe aujourd’hui par une plus grande coopération entre 
les entreprises appelées à collaborer autour d’un même produit. La réflexion sur les 
organisations industrielles qui se constituent désormais en « Architectures Industrielles » 
conduit à la mise au point d’outils spécifiques d’aide à la décision et au pilotage. L’objet de 
cet article est d’apporter des éléments de réponse à ce nouveau besoin, en proposant une 
formalisation de la coopération basée sur la négociation de la commande à travers les délais 
de livraison et le prix. 
KEY WORDS: decision-making, industrial architecture, cooperation, flows between firms, 
distributed control, Petri nets. 
MOTS-CLÉS : aide à la décision, architecture industrielle, coopération, flux interentreprises, 
pilotage distribué, réseaux de Petri. 
 
A part of this paper has been presented at the conference MOSIM'01 organized by A. Dolgui, 
held in April 2001 at the University of Technology of Troyes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Industrial Architecture (IA) notion was introduced for analyzing and 
controlling relationships between companies [HAU 99]. To generate a better 
productivity, these companies need the coordination of the actions which are 
distributed among autonomous partners [ALT 92], [KJE 98], [ROT 98]. Recent 
research shows a growing interest in studying cooperation relationships among the 
multiple actors of an industrial architecture [AXE 92], [RAP 87], [FER 01], 
[MON 01B]. 
Cooperation can take various forms. It can be defined as a collaboration between 
partners each having equivalent decisional capacity and acting together towards a 
common objective. One example of collaboration is the co-design in the automotive 
[WOM 92] or aeronautical sectors. Cooperation can also be defined as the 
coordination and synchronization of operations carried out by independent actors 
[MAL 94], [MON 01a]. Each partner has a limited decision power that corresponds 
to its action field [CAM 00], [CAM 97], [HUG 94]. 
To improve its reactivity and to better manage its costs, a company might 
consider subcontracting. It involves a “make or buy” decision. This may imply 
various time frames of decision: a long run decision defines for the company the 
whole of its external and internal nodes of production, distribution and supply 
[ARN 95]; a medium run specifies contracts (quantities, delays, prices…) that the 
company is likely to have with its internal and/or external providers in order to carry 
out a production program which reaches the best balance between cost and delay 
[DAM 95]; or a short run decision considers subcontracting simply for overload 
capacity in order to absorb the temporary fluctuation of demand [AHM 94]. 
In this paper, we are interested in the mechanism of order negotiation between a 
firm and its client and a firm and its providers. This mechanism’s aim is optimize 
the balance between the respect of the delay and the cost. In order to be effective, a 
distributed decision must take into account at the same time the autonomy of each 
firm and the global coherence of this decision. The objective of our work is to 
propose a formalization of the cooperation which coordinates the means used for 
consumer goods production. This formalization aims to establish an assistance tool 
for the distributed command of flows between firms. 
This work follows an analysis of machining companies (aluminum screw 
cutting) in the Arve valley of France. These companies commonly exchange among 
themselves a part or all their orders. This allows each to solve the reoccurring 
problem of internal production over-load. 
First, the context of the decision is presented and how decision-making is 
distributed is developed. We detail our approach in the second part using three 
complementary analysis methods: respecting only the cost or only the delay, or 
searching for a hybrid scenario. And finally we present some conclusions and 
further research. 
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2. The distributed decision 
 
2.1. The centralized and hierarchical approaches 
 
Historically, control in a network of firms was centralized [GIA 88]. Companies 
tried to control all the material flow from the first provider to the last client through 
a vertical integration. In this architecture, all the decisions are made in a unique 
center. This centralization of the decision generates a centralization of the 
information system and an information bottleneck. To avoid this difficulty, the 
hierarchical approach was developed. In this structure, different centers are 
coordinated by an entity that is hierarchically higher. All decision-making for a 
given level are centralized by this center called “coordinator”. The latter has all the 
necessary information which has been transmitted by the supervised centers (Figure 
1). 
A network with coordinators is representative of organizations where vertical 
integration is strongly present. The two aspects of this approach, hierarchical and 
centralized, allow better control of opportunist risks for each of partners. 
This hierarchical dependence for decision ensures the coherence of choices. But 
with this approach, it is difficult to admit that decision-making is often distributed in 
an Industrial Architecture. 
 
Coordinator
Decision
Center i Center j
Decision Decision
CenterCenter Center
Decision Decision Decision
Considered center
 
Figure 1. Hierarchical allocation of decisions 
 
 
2.2. An alternative for the centralized approach [JES 01] 
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With the distributed approach, we are considering a network with autonomous 
decision centers. This network can be described with a graph whose nodes represent 
decision centers and arcs decision making actions (Figure 2). This approach makes it 
possible to take into account constraints that must be respected in a decision center. 
Such constraints are the result of upstream decision centers (i.e. providers) and can 
influence downstream centers (i.e. clients). If constraints applied to a center are too 
restrictive, the decision is impossible. This is called a lack of autonomy. In this case 
upstream centers will not be able to validate their decisions. Negotiation is launched 
to find a consensus. 
Contrary to the centralized coordinated approach, this approach can, by 
definition, take into account the distributed nature of decisions. On the other hand, it 
needs to apply specific management methods to ensure both a control of opportunist 
behavior and a coherence of distributed choices throughout the IA. These methods 
will be developed in this paper. 
The theory of decision distribution is currently a subject of much discussion. 
The LAMIH suggests a formal decentralized control system to help design a 
complex product (as applied to GEC-ALSTOM) [TRE 01]. The DIAM develops a 
method of decentralized control for client/provider relationship. In this method, all 
providers in relation with a given client are assimilated into a virtual enterprise 
whose members allocate production tasks using a set of proposals [OUN 01].  
 
An additional advantage of the distributed approach is that a provider company 
(or client) is taken into account throughout the several IAs, while in centralized 
approach, all information must be grouped at one hierarchical level. This is difficult 
to obtain if a firm is active in several IAs where decision centers’ constraints are 
superimposed and even are in competition with one another. 
 
Upstream centers Downstream centersConsidered center's
constraints
Decision
Decision Decision
Decision
 
Figure 2. Allocation of the distributed decisions [MON 01c] 
 
 
2.3. Negotiation, a concerted decision making 
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In a distributed decision-making structure, each member-company of the IA is 
considered an independent decision center and is therefore capable of modifying the 
details of the industrial process, which it has elected to include in its activity.  In a 
cooperative context, a member-company’s internal decisions have to be considered. 
Cooperation can be described as a will to act collectively towards a common goal. 
In the case of inter-firm industrial flow control, cooperation can be considered to be 
the coordination of the means of each company composing the IA, to produce goods 
that in the end, generally optimize an equilibrium among cost, quality and delay. 
This coordination allows the making of consistent individual decisions and aims at 
synchronizing them. 
Decision-making becomes necessary when the environment changes. A change 
can be external to the member-company (direct decision maker’s environment), as is 
the case of receiving an additional order from a client or when a problem occurs 
with a provider; or it can be the result of an internal evolution, when an unexpected 
event appears in the company itself.  Here, cooperation promotes both collective and 
distributed decision-making, aiming to synchronize actions shared among the 
different partners. We are in a co-decision context which intends to coordinate 
individual actions. 
 
Refusal
Rest
NegotiationNew Dem.
New demand
Proposal
Agreement
Answer wait
Proposal
Agreement
Refusal
 
Figure 3. Evolution of negotiation 
 
 
The Petri net (Figure 3) illustrates the mechanism of the decision making. When 
a demand is initially detected, the Rest token, which indicates there is no 
negotiation, is consumed. The negotiation phase creates three possibilities of firing. 
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Depending on a feasibility study, decision-makers can either further negotiation by 
replying with a proposal, or stop it by replying with an agreement or a refusal. If he 
receives a proposal, the second partner will determine his possibility of firing. 
Decision-making is interactive. When a company has to deal with situations beyond 
its control, conducting a feasibility study causes the company to make new demands 
on providers who will in their turn have to start negotiations [MON 00]. Decision-
makers have to take partners’ prerogatives into account during the decision making. 
By this process each partners’ internal constraints have been propagated among the 
IA. 
So, by this decisional mechanism which respects the propagation of constraints, 
we guarantee at the same time, center’s autonomy of a decision and the coherence 
of decision making between centers [MON 01c]. A group of bilateral decisions 
acting in concert with two protagonists can guarantee general coherence in an IA 
having a treelike structure, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
C1
C2
Si
S2
S1
E
Considered companySubcontractors Clients
Cj
 
Figure 4. Partial representation of an IA having a tree structure 
 
 
3. Our suggested approach 
 
3.1. Industrial Architecture modeling 
 
3.1.1. A company in relation with its partners 
 
IA modeling needs to consider companies as independent and interrelated 
entities [BOU 97]. Our model will present an enterprise (E) in relation to providers 
(S) and clients (C). 
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This representation of an enterprise (Figure 5), member of an IA, is based on 
two flow types: information flows (dotted lines) and material flows (continuous 
lines). These two flow types are oriented and controlled by a fundamental function 
of flow control (GF). On the other hand, to illustrate the transformation process of 
material flow, it is important to show the internal processing system (in gray). 
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Figure 5. General structure of an enterprise in relation with its partners 
 
 
This internal processing system is considered as a controlled process which 
consumes raw materials (MP) and creates manufactured products (PF). 
This enterprise model has a real sense only in relation with its S and its C. The 
enterprise can be interpreted as a S or as a C depending on the point of view. 
 
3.1.2. Flows related to operational control of inter-firm relationships 
 
These flows are divided into two categories: 
− Information flows, necessary for IA management, 
− Material flows, comprising physical inter-firm trade. 
Our goal is to model, in a single formalism, all these flows. This is why we have 
chosen to use an aggregate structure allowing us to avoid, owing to encapsulation of 
data, increasing the size of the model, in spite of the numerous types of flows. 
Moreover, this approach permits us to easily take into account a new type of flow. 
 
3.1.2.1. Information flows 
 
We are particularly interested in the information flows necessary for operational 
control. Also, these information exchanges are the main basis for the inter-firm 
cooperation. 
An information flow in a commercial relationship is, in part, characterized by a 
sender/recipient pair constituted by C and S. Inter-firm exchange is essentially based 
on an order and its evolution. We define an order as a flow of information between 
two companies which contains following data: 
− The product concerned by the exchange, 
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− The quality needed, 
− The delivery deadline.  
This order follows an evolution in two phases: in the first one, the order is 
generated. At this stage, companies search together to define the specifications 
(product, quality, delay) of the order. The second phase is more operational, and 
aims to control the flow of material through the IA. This is characterized by the 
attribute “qualifier” of the aggregate “information flow” which can be: (numbers 
pertain to Figure 6): 
− New client’s demand (1), 
− Client’s proposal (2), 
− Client’s estimated order, 
− Client’s definite order, 
− New enterprise’s demand (3), 
− Enterprise’s proposal (4), 
− Enterprise’s estimated order, 
− Enterprise’s definite order, 
− Provider’s proposal (5). 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the state of negotiation between sender and recipient 
of a flow is denoted by the attribute “status” of this aggregate. This state is 
represented by two fields illustrating the points of view of the two companies in 
negotiation, one square represents the client’s position (C) and the other the 
provider’s position (S) for the product concerned. 
First, a proposal has to be validated (AV) by the second partner, who will accept 
it (A), or refuse it (R), or make a counterproposal (AV). Negotiation will finish on a 
common agreement (status <A, A>) or on one partner’s refusal (status <A, R> or 
status <R, A>). With this process, we are able to follow the evolution of an order 
during its “life cycle”. The Figure 6 illustrates a possible evolution of an order, 
from the “new demand” to the “final agreement”. In this figure, a mutual agreement 
is found after four successive proposals were sent and negotiated. It shows the 
order’s generation process based on negotiation that we will develop in detail 
below. The example showed here illustrates how the “status” attribute changes over 
the order generation phase (first phase), but this attribute is also used during the 
material flow control phase, to denote, for example, of the final state of an order 
(Accepted or Refused). 
For this flow, we will use notation as follows: 
− Information flow < qualifier, product, quantity, delay, status, sender, recipient 
> 
The “Product” aggregate included in information flow, but also in material flow, 
identifies the product concerned by the exchange. It is described by its designation, 
the required quality and its price. 
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New demand (1)
<A, AV>
E
S
Feasibility study
C
Proposal (5)
<AV, A>
Proposal (4)
<AV, A>
t
t
t
Counterproposal (2)
<A, AV>
Counterproposal
<AV, A>
Counterproposal
<AV, A>
Agreement
<A, A>
(3)
 
Figure 6. An example of order generation 
 
3.1.2.2. Material flows 
 
Material flows include materials (MP) (materials from S and supplies from C), 
or manufactured products (PF), as well as billing flow (bill) or payment flow 
(payment). The attributes – product, quantity, sender, and recipient – are the same as 
those concerned in information flows. The “transportation time” is necessary for the 
feasibility study of a demand. For this flow, we will use the following notation: 
− Material flow <sender, recipient, transportation time, product, quantity> 
Thus, through this formalism based on aggregate structure, we are able to 
represent whole flows circulating in an IA. Figure 7 illustrates the structures of 
these inter-firm flows. 
 
 Sender
 Recipient
 Transport. time
 Quantity
Material flow
 Product
 Designation
 Quality
 Price
 ProductInformation flow
 Qualifier
 Quantity
 Delay
 Sender
 Recipient
 Product
 Status
 Client
 Supplier
 Status
 
Figure 7. Aggregates illustrating inter-firm flows 
 
3.2. Negotiation mechanism 
 
3.2.1. New demand feasibility 
 
When a company receives a new demand from a client, it has a choice among 
three complementary decisions. This choice is based on estimating the constraints 
induced by this new demand. The company: 
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ient (Refusal). 
cision 
in t Autonomy is satisfied if 
add  ith constraints already 
pre
s based on the evaluation of the 
loa
ct the whole set of time 
con
− can totally accept this demand respecting all constraints (Agreement), 
− can propose constraints modifications (Proposal), 
− or can refuse this demand from the cl
These three choices have been studied at the one company’s center of de
ligh  of that center’s degree of autonomy [CAM 97]. 
ing new an order does not generate incompatibility w
sent in the center. If autonomy is satisfied, the center can make a decision 
respecting all constraints (decision under constraints). On the other hand, if a lack of 
autonomy is detected, the center is able to propose constraints modifications to 
satisfy its own autonomy (decision on constraints). 
The choice is based on an algorithm for new demand estimation. The goal is to 
decide, using knowledge of the systems current state, if a company β can accept or 
not a new demand from its client α. This decision i
d on a production center. To determine rapidly in what conditions the company is 
able to manufacture the new order, a comparison is made between the added load 
induced by this new manufacturing demand and the idle (unused production 
capacity) of each planning period (Figure 8). This analysis is done by focusing on 
the bottleneck activity1 of the internal production system. 
This estimation is divided into two phases. The first detects a lack of autonomy 
or not, and starts negotiation with providers if necessary. The second phase 
determines how the order has to be modified to respe
straints in the IA. 
 
Load
i i+1
Idle
Maximum load
Planning period
Dp
 
Figure 8. Load of a production center 
 
 
 would be based on negotiation of delivery 
eadlines which is a very important criterion in the IA control. Currently, supply 
hain management tools aim mainly at optimizing the reduction of “logistic fat” 
which consists of the time wasted by a bad coordination. 
                            
We have decided that cooperation
d
c
 
1 We call bottleneck activity, activity which most restrains the load in the internal 
production process. 
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to satisfy decision center 
aut
 the other companies in the IA, 
or 
 typology of various constraints influencing decision-making. 
 
The feasibility study of a new order tries to determine if introducing an 
additional load is possible given the state of the system of production. If all 
constraints exerted on the company cannot be respected, estimation mechanisms 
will try to relax a part of these constraints in order 
onomy. Before presenting the principle of evaluation, we would like to define a 
typology of constraints influencing order feasibility. 
We can distribute the different constraints into two distinct categories 
(Figure 9): 
− internal constraints which are within the company considered, 
− external constraints which follow either from
from the external environment (i.e. not from IA). 
Here is a
Internal Constraints
•Delivery date and place
• Quantity
• Quality
Internal Constraints
•Delivery delay
• min. & max. quantity
• Quality
External environment constraints
Internal Constraints
• Manufacturing range
• Stock Level
• Management policy
• Capacity
Enterprise
Considered decision centerSuppliers Clients
External constraints External constraints
 
Figure 9. Constraints influencing a decision center 
 
3.2.1.1. Internal constraints influencing the order feasibility 
 
− time constraints: 
− the production set up time. 
essing time refers to the time necessary to manufacture 
one  required. The production set up time corresponds to the 
necess  sources (tools changes, adjusting of 
machin
batch size, 
uction capacity. 
The
sical constraint. In reality, these determine interactions with providers 
(for th d with clients (for the manufactured products). The batch 
They are of two types, 
− the unit production processing time, 
The unit production proc
 batch of the product
ary delay to reconfigure manufacture re
es…) 
− physical constraints: 
− the quantity of products in inventory (raw materials and manufactured 
products), 
− the 
− the maximum prod
 quantity of raw materials and manufactured products in inventory  is a 
strong phy
e raw materials) an
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size is e hes to be launch. Finally, production 
cap
nected to the 
com any (direct partners): clients and providers. 
ternal time constraints 
or physical constraints.  
Th
date when the last internal 
ma
 to the delivery quantity, to the quality and to the 
ly raw materials or services. Their external 
arting an 
int l
very size. These depend on raw 
r example, 
gislation limits the decision framework. Consequently, working time and the flow 
king traffic limitation on week-
nds …). 
o-criterion negotiation: delay 
oduct P: 
Information flow <New_demand, product_p, Qp, Dp, <A, AV>, α, β> 
− Qp is the quantity of product p to be delivered; 
uct_p is composed by: <P, quality_p, C >; 
−
− ct quality; 
 us d to determine the number of batc
acity refers to the maximum load allowable in a planning period. 
 
3.2.1.2. External constraints influencing the order feasibility 
 
These follow from other IA-member companies directly con
p
− Clients: Clients are demand initiators. They create ex
eir time constraints are related to the requested delivery date (deadline). This 
delivery date is a constraint date, it indicates the latest 
nufacture activity has to finish.  
Physical constraints are related
price. These physical constraints determine attributes that the outgoing physical 
flow has to respect. Here, we can recognize the cost/quality/delay triptych. 
− Providers: Providers supp
constraints are also time or physical constraints.  
Time constraints are related to the possible delivery date (release). This delivery 
date of raw materials is a constraint date. It indicates the soonest date for st
erna  manufacturing activity using these raw materials.  
Physical constraints are related to the batch deli
materials packages, which could be different from the company’s needs. 
 
3.2.1.3. Constraints from the external environment: 
 
It is important to take the environment into account. In France, fo
le
of material are limited (35-hour work week law, truc
e
These should be considered as absolute constraints: they are fully external to the 
Industrial Architecture. By definition, these constraints are not negotiable. 
3.2.2. Mon
3.2.2.1. Mainspring of the estimation 
 
Given the following new demand of pr
Where: 
− Dp is the required delivery time; 
− α et β are respectively the client and the “provider” company; 
− prod p
 P is the product designation; 
 quality_p is the required produ
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−  is the quantity of product p in inventory ; 
−  i
−  i nufacture a batch of product p; 
 of production towards the product p. 
NO ve chosen to merge the required 
del eadline. 
e he three complementary 
channel
es Manufact. Purchasing 
− Cp is the price. 
The internal constraints of the company (E):  
Ip
Lp s the batch size of the product p; 
Fp s the time to ma
− Rp is the time necessary for the change
TE. – In order to simplify this presentation, we ha
ivery time Dp and the bottleneck activity d
Th  feasibility study of a new command will use t
s showed in the Table 1, and involving more and more resources. 
 
Realization mode  \  Involvement Sal
service service 
Delivery with manufactured product in   
inventory  
 
Manufacture using raw ateri s in inventory  m al      
Manufacture using raw materials supplying    
T  
 
 
Therefore, firstly we determine if the demand can be satisfied with manufactured 
rtest channel for the feasibility study. If 
anufactured product inventory is insufficient, the production function will be 
ved. Finally, and if the raw materials inventories are insufficient, the 
pur
re 10 illustrates the stages followed according to 
the
able 1. Resources used for an order
product inventory. This is the sho
m
invol
chasing service will be involved requiring eventual exchanges with providers. 
Thus it is necessary to follow the third channel, which is the longest because it can 
generate negotiations with providers. Internal decision-making will require waiting 
for answers from several partners. 
We strive to reduce the time necessary for the feasibility study by formalizing 
this decision-making and the negotiations ensuing from it. The feasibility study 
successively follows these three channels, checking in each stage that constraints are 
respected. The diagram of the Figu
 different decision channels. 
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Figure 10. Decision progress 
 
3.2.2.2. Algorithm of new demand estimation: 
 
The following algorithm uses two sub-functions that, respectively, either allow 
making a decision under constraints (search for an insertion abiding by the delay), 
or allow making a decision on the constraints (search for a realizable insertion). A 
complementary re-estimation procedure is necessary when one of the answers given 
by the providers is not according to the initial need. This procedure assumes 
changes can be propagated to the client. 
This algorithm explores the three decision channels. It will be based on the two 
other procedures for the “decision under constraints” and for the “decision on the 
constraints”. Dmax is the real bottleneck deadline (at the beginning, Dmax = Dp). 
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If [ 0SpQp ≤− ] then   ## Manufactured product inventory 
comparison 
 Answer sending = agreement ## Inventory is sufficient 
Else 
 ( )⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡ −
=
Lp
SpQpup_roundNd  ## Number of batch to launch 
    ## Induced load on the center RpFpNpCHp +×=
 Search for an insertion abiding by the delay ## Estimation under constraints 
 If insertion is possible, then 
  Comparison with the raw materials inventory 
  If inventory is sufficient, then answer sending = agreement 
  Else 
   Suppliers new demands sending 
   If answer is agreement, then answer sending = agreement 
   If answer is proposal or refusal, then re-estimation 
 Else  
  Search for the shortest delay   ## Estimation on the constraints 
 If insertion is possible, then 
  Comparison with the raw materials inventory 
  If inventory is sufficient, then answer sending = proposal 
  Else  
   Suppliers new demands sending 
   If answer is agreement, then answer sending = proposal  
   If answer is proposal or refusal, then re-estimation 
  Else answer sending = refusal 
Figure 11. Algorithm of new demand estimation 
 
 
3.2.2.3. Search for an insertion abiding by the delay (decision under constraints) 
 
The goal of this algorithm is to determine the existence of an insertion respecting 
the deadline. This insertion will not have to exceed the manufacturing center’s load 
limit. This algorithm allows to know the latest raw materials needs date for potential 
negotiations with providers. We have chosen to insert this new command using the 
latest production policy. So the induced load (CHp) will be inserted as close as 
possible before the bottleneck deadline Dp. The insertion could be made under a 
maximum of two planning periods. We suppose the planning period is longer than 
the industrial cycle. 
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i+1 is the planning period that contains the bottleneck deadline Dp
Insertion = false, Stop = false 
While (Insertion = false and Stop = false) do 
  
 If then 
  Insertion = true 
   
  start production period = i  ## need for the entering products date 
  end production period = i+1 ## availability of the outgoing products date 
 Else 
  If ( ) then 
   Insertion = true 
    
    
  start production period = i-1 ## need for the entering products date 
  end production period = i+1 ## availability of the outgoing products date 
  Else 
   i = i-1 
   If (i = stop_min_date
CHp)i(idle −=ε
0≥ε
ε−= )i(idle)i(idle
0)1i(idle ≥ε+−
0)i(idle =
ε+−=− )1i(idle)1i(idle
2) then Stop = true 
Figure 12. Decision under constraints algorithm 
 
 
3.2.2.4. Search of the shortest delay (decision on the constraints) 
 
When a lack of autonomy is detected, it is important to determine how 
constraints have to be changed to be able to satisfy an order. The goal of this 
algorithm is to define a possible insertion date minimizing the change. As the 
previous algorithm, this new delay will be a framework for potential negotiations 
with providers. Here we will try to find the earliest insertion after the bottleneck 
deadline Dp. 
 
                             
2 That date represents the most acceptable lead time following the first deadline. 
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i is the planning period that contains the bottleneck deadline Dp
Insertion = false, Stop = false 
While (Insertion = false and Stop = false) do 
  
 If then 
  Insertion = true 
   
  start production period = i  ## need for the entering products date 
  end production period = i+1 ## availability of the outgoing products date 
  
CHp)i(idle −=ε
0≥ε
ε−= )i(idle)i(idle
1iDmaxp +=   
 Else 
  If ( ) then 
   Insertion = true 
    
    
  start production period = i  ## need for the entering products date 
  end production period = i+2 ## availability of the outgoing products date 
  
0)1i(idle ≥ε++
0)i(idle =
ε++=+ )1i(idle)1i(idle
2iDmax p +=  
  Else 
   i = i+1 
   If (i = stop_max_date) then Stop = true 
Figure 13. New deadline Dmaxp research (decision on the constraints algorithm) 
 
 
3.2.2.5. Re-estimation 
 
This complementary procedure is necessary when providers’ answers do not 
respect all the internal constraints. It is a matter of the re-estimating insertion 
possibility respecting the raw materials delivery lead times given by providers 
(release). This procedure is very close to the search for the shortest delay, on the 
other hand the search is executed not after Dmax, but after the most restricting date 
between Dmax and the raw materials delivery dates DL(MP). 
Here, external constraints from providers are known in advance. So the result of 
this re-estimation is sure to respect external constraints from providers. It will not be 
necessary to negotiate with these partners. 
In this case, i is the planning period that contains the most restricting date 
between Dmax and the raw materials delivery dates DL(MP) (see Figure 13). 
 
 
 
3.2.3. Multi-criteria negotiation: cost / delay 
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3.2.3.1. Global decision structure and decision under constraints 
 
The feasibility analysis is made under the constraints already presented in the 
chapter  3.2.1 
We will use the p product’s order which is defined by the following attributes: 
<Qp, Dp, Cp>. We also take into account the maximum production capacity per 
period, as well as the already existing load on each period. This load comes from the 
rest of the company’s customers. 
First, the new order <Qp, Dp, Cp> of P product is compared to the inventory 
level. If [ 0IpQp ≤− ] then it’s possible to deliver this order only with the inventory 
P product. Else,  defines the need of p to be produced.   
The second stage consists in inserting this new production in the planning. 
IpQp−
 
New demand
<Qp, Dp, Cp>
Stock level
i
Maximum load
Planning period
Idle
Load
Dp
i+1
New production
Extra-load
 
Figure 14. Decision under constraints 
 
 
( ) RpFp
Lp
IpQpup_roundCHp +×⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡ −
=   [1.]
To respect all constraints, CHp should be inserted before the deadline Dp. We 
have chosen to insert this new command using the latest production policy. If the 
insertion is possible, the company can respect all the described constraints and 
deliver the product P. Else, it is possible to relax some of the constraints. The 
company may: 
− Modify the deadline Dp and propose a later one D’p, 
− Employ subcontractors and/or overtimes which increase the cost Cp, 
− Use a hybrid solution by slightly modifying Dp and Cp. 
 
Distributed control of a supply-chain     81 
Decision under
constraints
No
Accord sending
Yes
Cost
New delay ?
Delay
New demand
Alternative solution
research
Multi-criteria decision
Proposition sending
Dmaxp
<Qp, Dp, Cp>
New cost ?Hybrid researches Cmaxp
<Qp, Dmaxp, Cp> <Qp, Dp, Cmaxp>
<Qp, Dip, Cip>
 
Figure 15. Structure for multi-criteria cost / delay decision 
 
 
This decision structure is described in the Figure 15. If the decision under 
constraints is not possible, an alternative solution research is launched. This stage 
contains the three analyses mentioned above. First, an analysis with respect to the 
cost gives a maximum modified deadline called Dmaxp. At the same time, an 
analysis with respect to the delay gives a maximum modified cost called Cmaxp. 
This cost includes the overtimes and subcontractors’ to be used. With these two 
data, Dmaxp and Cmaxp, a hybrid solution is constructed. This analysis uses Dmaxp 
and Cmaxp to limit the research area. 
A multi-criteria decision compares the different scenarios. A proposal 
corresponding to the best arrangement between cost and delay is sent to the client. 
 
3.2.3.2. Analysis with respect to the cost 
 
The goal of this analysis is to determine a new deadline Dmaxp that respects the 
load of the company. The algorithm is detailed in the Figure 12. The method is very 
similar to insertion with respect to the delay, but the research starts at the deadline 
Dp and move forwards trying to find the earliest idle. This analysis is also used in 
the hybrid research to determine, for each planning period, the “extra-load”, which 
has to be done by subcontractors or by overtimes. In this case, for each period i, the 
overload εp is produced with these two extra-resources. 
Lp
Fp
up_roundp ×⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡ ε
=ε   [2.]
 
 
 
3.2.3.3. Analysis with respect to the delay 
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A company may be unable to fill an order within the required delay Dp given by 
the client due to insufficient capacities. In this case, the company may investigate 
whether: 
− to subcontract a part or the entire overload using providers (“extra-load”), 
− to plan overtime for the in-house increase of its capacities. 
A mathematical model is established in order to simulate these strategies 
[BOU 01]. The model gives the quantities of each product be produced in-house 
and/or to be bought from providers for minimizing the cost in each scenario. In our 
case study, the constraints to be satisfied are related to: the internal capacities, the 
order, the transport capacities, the inventory status, and the delays. 
Each scenario may have a different cost and the one with the lowest cost will be 
chosen. 
 
3.2.3.3.1. Indices, sets and data 
 
The following notations are considered: 
− p ∈ ⎨1…P⎬: a product type,  
− fp ∈ ⎨1…Fp⎬: index relating to each potential provider of the product p. 
The following data are also considered for our model: 
− εp: demand for each product p which corresponds to the overload to be 
subcontracted and/or done in-house using overtime. 
− CAPMinp : minimum capacity of the in-house production of the product p 
− CAPMaxp : maximum capacity of the in-house production of the product p 
− CAPtranMinfp: minimum capacity of product p transport, if the potential 
provider fp is used. 
− CAPtranMaxfp: maximum capacity of product p transport, if the potential 
provider fP is used. 
− Ip: inventory level of product p at the end of the period considered by the 
command. 
− Cvarp: variable cost for the product p in-house production. This will include 
the extra cost that corresponds to overtime in case where this scenario is considered. 
− Cfixp: fixed cost for the product p in-house production. 
− Cachfp: unit price of purchasing from the provider fp. 
− Ctranspfp: unit cost of transport from the provider fp. 
− Cfixfp: fixed cost of purchasing from the provider fp.  
− hp: holding cost per unit of inventory. 
− Fp: in-house manufacturing lead time of a product p batch. 
− Lp: in-house production batch size of the product p. 
− Fp,fp: procurement lead time of a product p batch from provider fp.  
− Lp,fp: procurement batch size of product p from provider fp. 
− Dp: delay to be respected for product p (given by customer order). 
 
3.2.3.3.2. Decision variables 
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   1 if provider fp is used to produce p 
Zp,fp =     
   0 if not 
 
Xp,fp 
 : quantity of product p provided from fp. 
 [3.]
   1 if product p is made in-house (i) 
Zp,i =   
   0 if not 
 
Xp,i : quantity of product p manufactured in-house (i) using internal 
resources. 
 [4.]
 
3.2.3.3.3. Objective function 
 
The considered objective is to minimize the costs (fixed and variable) related to 
the option “make”, to the option “buy”, as well as to minimize the storage cost 
which is common to both options.  
The objective function is then written as follows: 
{ { [ ] [
] }}pp
f
pf
f
ppff
p
pi,ppp
Ihf,ZpCfix
f,Xp)CtranspCacha()i,ZpCfixXvarC(Min
p
p
p
p
+
+++×+×
∑
∑∑
  [5.]
3.2.3.3.4. Constraints 
 
− Internal capacity:  
CAPMinp  Zp,i ≤ Xp,i ≤ CAPMaxp Z p,i ∀ p [6.]
Each time one chooses to make εp in-house (Z p,i = 1), the quantity to be 
produced is limited by a minimum capacity related to the economy of scale and a 
maximum capacity related to the capacity of the production means and available 
resources. This is true for each product of the current period of planning. Through 
this constraint, we will be able to check also that if Zp,i = 0 (one decides not to 
make in-house), then Xp,i = 0. 
 
− Demand:  
X p,i+ ∑  ≤ ε
pf
pf,Xp p       ∀ p, fp [7.]
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This constraint makes it possible to express that the in-house and outside 
produced quantities are limited by the estimated request for each product for the 
current period of planning. 
 
− Transport capacity: 
CAPtranMinfp Zp,fp ≤ Xp, fp≤ CAPtranMaxfp Zp, fp ∀p, fp [8.]
The bought quantities for each product (p) are limited by the maximum 
capacities of transport related to the corresponding provider (capacities of the 
transport means). This constraint implies also that if one decides not to buy from fp 
(Zp,fP = 0), then Xp,fP = 0. 
 
− Inventory level: 
I p = I p,0+ X p,i + - ε ∑
pf
pf,Xp p ∀ p [9.]
This constraint may be used to express the fact that inventory at the end of the 
current planning period is a function of the quantity in inventory  at the beginning of 
the period (I p,0), the in-house produced quantities, the bought quantities and, for 
each product, this is decreased by the request planned over the considered period. 
 
− Delay respect: 
Max Dp
L
X
F,
L
X
F
p
p
f,p
f,p
fp,p
p
i,p
p ≤
⎪⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
 ∀ p [10.]
This constraint allows the respect of the times imposed by the received order, if 
one decides to make in-house by considering additional overtime, or to use external 
providers, without however excluding the two options at the same time. In any case, 
the time needed to fill the order is the maximum between the in-house completion 
dates and the lead times of external providers. Indeed, if one chooses the external 
supply the time required to fill the order corresponds to the provider who has the 
longest deadlines. In the same way and if one selects the two options at the same 
time, the time will correspond to the maximum between the internal times and the 
times corresponding to the external chosen providers. This time must be lower or at 
least equal to that required by the customer (Dp). For the solution of the model and 
in order to express the constraints in a linear way, so that they can be solved using 
linear programming software (such as LINDO), this constraint is expressed as 
following: 
Distributed control of a supply-chain     85 
p
p
i,p
p DL
X
F ≤  ∀ p [11.]
p
f,p
f,p
fp,p DL
X
F
p
p ≤  ∀ p,fp [12.]
Xp,i≥0 ; Xp,fp≥0 ; Ip≥0 ∀ p, fp [13.]
This constraint expresses the sign of the decision variables. The quantities to be 
produced in-house or to be possibly bought outside must be positive. 
Z p,i ; Z p,fp    ∈  ⎨ 0,1 ⎬ ∀ p, fp [14.]
These binary variables are related to the choice “make or buy”. The possibility 
of choosing the two options at the same time (to make together) is not excluded. 
 
3.2.3.4. Multi-criteria decision 
 
In response to the order (represented by C (Dp , Cp) on the fig. 6) and if the client 
is unable to give satisfactory constraints for the costs and the deadlines at the same 
time, several cases can be considered:  
− to respect the deadline (Dp) while considering either additional overtime or 
subcontracting the internal overload capacity. A (Dp, Cmaxp) corresponds to this 
case. Cmaxp is given by the first two terms of the objective function which 
correspond to the cost of making in-house by considering additional overtime and/or 
buying cost when considering external providers (linear program), 
− to respect the cost (Cp) given by the order, while seeking for an insertion 
date according to the internal production load (algorithm Figure 13). This case is 
represented by B (Dmaxp, Cp), 
− to look for a compromise between cost and delay, A and B limit a zone that 
represents a set of possible scenarios (Mi). 
These scenarios (Mi) could answer the customer’s order in the case where neither 
cost, nor deadline given by the order are considered as constraints. Indeed, by 
regarding deadline as major constraint, this will increase costs considerably and vice 
versa. Hence it will be possible to seek and to find the scenario which satisfies as 
well as possible both costs and deadlines. 
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A (Dp ,Cmaxp)
C (Dp , Cp) delay
Cost
B (Dmaxp , Cp)
 M (Dip , Cip)
Dmaxp
Cmaxp
 
C: command under study. 
A: Proposal with respect to the command imposed delay. 
B: Proposal with respect to the command imposed cost. 
M (Dip , Cip ): Proposal set relaxing cost and delay constraints / 
 Dp < Dip < Dmaxp 
 Cp < Cip < Cmaxp 
 and Dip = Dp + i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Dmaxp – Dp -1 
 
Figure 16. hybrid scenarios generation 
 
Consider a new delay to be proposed (Dip) ranging between Dp and Dmaxp 
incremented by subsequent periods. To define Mi , the corresponding cost (Cip) will 
be deduced considering either to make in-house, or to buy the overload observed 
capacity for the new delay (linear program). 
For scenario evaluation, the following method chooses the best scenario which 
answers as well as possible both cost and delay criteria : 
− compute the percentage of margin between the order and the cost and delays 
established for each scenario (A, B, Mi). 
− weigh these deviations according to cost and delay by a coefficient which 
represents the relative importance of each criterion in negotiation. This depends on 
the type of relationship between the client and the provider and the client’s 
priorities. Hence, a new set of points (A′, B′, M′i) with these new coordinates is 
attributed to each scenario. 
− calculate the norm of the vector given by each new point A′, B′, M′i 
representing the balanced variation compared to the order. The scenarios which 
make it possible to have the lowest distance compared to the origin correspond to 
those which can be proposed to the client in response to his order. 
⎟
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⎜
⎝
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4. Conclusion and future research 
 
New Industrial Architecture organization based on cooperation highlight the 
problem of flow control and management by independent decision centers. Decision 
distribution along the supply chain needs coherence between partners in order to 
achieve better productivity and greater reactivity. 
In this article, we have studied order negotiation between a client-manufacturer 
and its providers. In the case where the provider is unable to satisfy all the 
constraints of an order, each member of the IA should use its own external 
subcontractors or propose a modification of the delivery delay. Hence, different 
scenarios could be considered by relaxing some order constraints. Such an analysis 
will define new cost and delay to be used in a new proposal. A method based on 
multi-criteria analysis has been proposed to evaluate the best scenario. 
In further research, we will introduce the quantity as a decision criterion. Indeed, 
a company can supply a part of the command in time and deliver the rest later. Other 
criteria, related to the level of quality to be respected by subcontractors, should also 
be considered in the decision. 
Moreover, we will develop an algorithm taking into account several parallel 
negotiations with several clients. This is important to be able to apply our methods 
in a real industrial environment. 
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